падение уровня жизни, но и создать фундамент для дальнейшего развития человеческого капитала. Дальнейший прогресс будет зависеть от способности страны ускорять технологическую модернизацию, расширять экспортный потенциал и повышать эффективность государственного управления. Можно с уверенностью сказать, что к концу первой четверти XXI в. Республика Беларусь продемонстрировала способность своей социально-экономической системы успешно адаптироваться к внешним вызовам и достигать поставленных целей в ключевых областях.

Главными достижениями этого периода стали: обеспечение макроэкономической и социальной стабильности; превращение агропромышленного комплекса в высокоэффективный экспортно-ориентированный сектор; успешное развитие IT-индустрии; сохранение и укрепление социально ориентированной модели государства. Эта модель, основанная на гарантиях занятости, доступности образования, здравоохранения и жилья, а также всесторонней поддержке семьи, обеспечила достойные стандарты качества жизни для подавляющего большинства граждан [1, с. 210–215].

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ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF MODERN TECHNOLOGIES

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The ethical and social dimensions of technology have moved from the periphery to the center of philosophical concern in recent decades. This shift reflects a growing awareness that the scale and depth of modern technological interventions demand a correspondingly robust and sophisticated ethical reflection. The ethics of technology is not a single, unified theory but a field characterized by a plurality of normative approaches, each bringing distinct resources and perspectives to bear on the moral challenges posed by technological development.

Keywords: ethics, ethics, philosophy of engineering, engineering and technology.

ЭТИЧЕСКИЕ ВЫЗОВЫ СОВРЕМЕННЫХ ТЕХНОЛОГИЙ

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Этические и социальные аспекты технологий в последние десятилетия переместились с периферии в центр философских интересов. Этот сдвиг отражает растущее осознание того, что масштаб и глубина современных технологических вмешательств требуют соответствующего прочного и сложного этического осмысления. Этика технологий – это не единая теория, а область, характеризующаяся множеством нормативных подходов,

каждый из которых предлагает уникальные ресурсы и перспективы для решения моральных вызовов, связанных с технологическим развитием.

Ключевые слова: этика, философия техники, техника и технология.

The relationship between technology and civilization constitutes one of the most profound and multifaceted subjects within contemporary philosophy. From the earliest stone implements to the intricate digital networks of the present day, technology has not merely served as an external instrument for human convenience but has actively reshaped social structures, cultural values, and even the very modes of human cognition and perception.

The ethical and social dimensions of technology have moved from the periphery to the center of philosophical concern in recent decades. Utilitarianism, with its foundational commitment to maximizing overall well-being and minimizing suffering, provides a powerful and intuitive framework for assessing technology. Its guiding principle is a form of cost-benefit analysis: a technology is morally acceptable if its overall consequences for human welfare are better than the alternatives [1]. This approach is deeply ingrained in contemporary practices of risk assessment and technology policy. For instance, the decision to approve a new pharmaceutical drug or to build a new power plant is often explicitly justified by a utilitarian calculus weighing its potential benefits (e. g., lives saved, energy provided) against its potential harms (e. g., side effects, environmental damage). The strengths of the utilitarian approach are its flexibility, its focus on tangible outcomes, and its impartiality. However, it also faces significant criticisms in the context of technology ethics. One major problem is the difficulty of predicting and quantifying all the consequences of a new technology, which may unfold over long time scales and across global populations. The development of the automobile, for example, brought immense benefits in mobility and economic growth, but its long-term consequences have included urban sprawl, air pollution, climate change, and millions of traffic fatalities-costs that were not fully anticipated or factored into early utilitarian assessments. Furthermore, utilitarianism can be accused of being insufficiently protective of individual rights and distributive justice. It might, in principle, sanction sacrificing the well-being of a minority if it leads to a greater aggregate benefit for the majority.

In contrast, deontological ethics, associated most famously with Immanuel Kant, shifts the focus from consequences to duties, rights, and principles. A deontological approach asks not “what outcome will produce the best?” but “what action is consistent with our moral duties and with respect for persons?” [2, p. 310]. The Kantian imperative to treat humanity always as an end in itself and never merely as a means has profound implications for technology. It grounds a robust set of individual rights-rights to privacy, to autonomy, to informed consent-that technologies must not violate, regardless of the aggregate benefit they might produce. For instance, a deontological perspective would condemn the secret collection of personal data by a government or corporation, even if it were done in the name of national security or economic efficiency, because it treats individuals as mere sources of information rather than as autonomous agents worthy of respect. Deontology provides a crucial bulwark against the instrumentalizing tendencies of a purely utilitarian, efficiency-driven technological order.

Virtue ethics, which traces its lineage to Aristotle, offers a distinct and valuable perspective on technology by shifting the ethical question from “What should I do?” to “What kind of person should I be?” and “What kind of life is worth living?”. This approach focuses on the cultivation of virtues-stable dispositions of character, such as courage, temperance, justice, and practical wisdom (phronesis) – and evaluates actions and institutions

in terms of their contribution to or detraction from human flourishing (eudaimonia) [3, p. 310]. In the context of technology, virtue ethics prompts a different set of questions than those posed by utilitarianism or deontology. It asks how our technologies shape our character and our relationships. Does the use of social media cultivate virtues like empathy, friendship, and intellectual humility, or vices like narcissism, envy, and distraction? Does the practice of engineering inculcate a narrow technical rationality or a broader sense of social responsibility and care? Philosophers of technology like Shannon Vallor have argued for the need to identify and cultivate specific "technomoral virtues" for the twenty-first century, such as self-control in our use of attention-grabbing devices, honesty in our online personas, and humility in the face of the complex and unpredictable systems we have created [1, p. 378]. Virtue ethics also provides a powerful framework for thinking about the meaning of technology in a good life. It resists the reduction of human well-being to measurable metrics of utility or the satisfaction of preferences. Instead, it focuses on the qualitative dimensions of human experience and activity. From this perspective, the concern is not just whether a technology is safe or efficient, but whether it enables or undermines meaningful work, authentic human connection, and the kind of practical engagement with the world that is constitutive of a flourishing life. For example, the automation of skilled craftsmanship may be efficient, but virtue ethics would ask what is lost when the human virtues of patience, attentiveness, and embodied skill are no longer exercised in the process of making.

The tradition of critical theory, originating with the Frankfurt School and extended by contemporary thinkers like Andrew Feenberg, provides a powerful socio-political lens for the analysis of technology Critical theory seeks not merely to describe or analyze society but to critique its structures of power with the aim of fostering a more just and rational social order. When applied to technology, critical theory challenges the presumption of technological neutrality. It argues that technologies are "congealed" forms of social relations and embody specific values and interests, often those of the dominant groups who design and control them. The layout of a city's transportation infrastructure, for example, is not a neutral technical solution; it reflects and reinforces choices about mobility that privilege automobile owners over public transit users, suburban residents over urban dwellers, and commerce over community. Feenberg's "critical theory of technology" rejects both hard technological determinism and naive instrumentalism. He argues for a "democratic rationalization" of technology, a process through which public participation and alternative values can intervene in the design process to shape technologies towards more humane and democratic ends [4, p. 322].

Beyond specific normative frameworks, the ethics of technology is defined by a cluster of recurrent and pressing thematic concerns that arise from the pervasive integration of technology into every facet of modern life. Consider, for example, the role of algorithms in decision-making, from credit scoring and predictive policing to the curation of our news feeds. These systems often operate as "black boxes", their internal logic hidden from users and even their creator. They make consequential decisions that shape our life chances and our understanding of the world, yet they are not subject to the same norms of accountability, transparency, and due process that govern human decision-makers. This erosion of transparency and control constitutes a direct threat to individual autonomy.

Furthermore, the phenomenon of technological "lock-in" illustrates a more subtle form of constraint on collective autonomy. Once a society has made substantial investments in a particular technological infrastructure-be it the internal combustion engine, the QWERTY keyboard, or the architecture of the internet-it becomes exceedingly difficult

and costly to switch to a different path, even if a superior alternative emerges. This path dependency creates a form of technological momentum that limits future choices. The ethical challenge is to find ways to maintain a degree of "interpretive flexibility" and to build into our technological systems the capacity for adaptation and revision, thereby preserving a space for collective self-determination in the face of the powerful inertial forces of the established technological order.

The rise of digital ICTs has brought the issue of privacy to the forefront of ethical and political debate. The capacity to collect, store, aggregate, and analyze vast quantities of personal data-from our online searches and purchases to our physical movements tracked by our phones-is unprecedented in human history. This capacity enables new forms of economic value creation (the "surveillance capitalism" model described by Shoshana Zuboff) and new modes of governmental and corporate power [5].

Thus, technology is far more than a collection of useful artifacts; it is a dynamic, world-shaping force that has been constitutive of human societies, economies, and modes of consciousness. Each major technological epoch has not only provided new means for meeting human needs but has also restructured the very conditions of human existence, creating new possibilities for flourishing while simultaneously generating novel forms of risk, inequality, and alienation.

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ШОПИНГ КАК ФОРМА ДОСУГА В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ БЕЛАРУСИ

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Проанализирована трансформация шопинга в значимую досуговую практику. На основе официальных статистических данных за 2024–2025 гг. рассмотрены особенности потребительского поведения в Беларуси. Выявлено, что шопинг выполняет не только утилитарную, но и рекреационную, коммуникативную и идентификационную функции, а молодежь совмещает офлайн- и онлайн-форматы как равнозначные досуговые практики.

Ключевые слова: общество потребления, шопинг, консьюмеризм, постмодерн, досуг, молодежь, торговые центры.